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Introduction
Since Manzini and Mariotti [2007] , the theory literature has witnessed a proliferation of bounded rationality models where the decision maker follows a two-stage choice procedure.
1 Broadly, the purpose of these models is to accommodate context effects in choice-related to a variety of psychological, social, or environmental factors-that are inconsistent with preference maximization.
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In this paper, I consider a simple two-stage procedure, transitive shortlist methods (TSM), which departs only mildly from the standard model. Instead of maximizing a single preference, the decision maker sequentially maximizes a pair (P 1 , P 2 ) of transitive but potentially incomplete rationales. From the "shortlist" of feasible alternatives that maximize the first rationale P 1 , the decision maker ultimately selects the unique alternative that maximizes the second rationale P 2 .
The main results establish solid choice-theoretic foundations for the TSM model. Axiomatically, it is characterized by a Strong Exclusivity condition which imposes clear limitations on the possibility of context effects in choice (Theorem 2). This axiom stipulates that behavior consistent with the model cannot simultaneously display two (types of) choice reversals frequently observed in the data. In terms of identification, these choice reversals bear a straightforward connection to revealed preference in the model: each type of reversal independently reveals the content of one rationale (Theorem 4). What is more, these revealed rationales may be determined from choices on "small" menus (Theorem 3); and, they may be used to characterize the TSM-representations consistent with behavior (Theorem 5).
To put these results in context, it is worth noting that the TSM model has been studied in several papers (Au and Kawai [2011] ; Lleras et al. [2011] ; and, Yildiz [2015] ) since it was suggested by Manzini and Mariotti [2006] . 3 As discussed in Section 7, the characterizations provided in these papers rely on a technical acyclicity condition (similar to SARP) that provides little insight into the behavior associated with the model. In addition, the limited work on identification in these papers does not establish the simple connection between the rationales and some readily observable context effects in choice. Three separate motivations underlie the main results. First and foremost is the view that a clear grasp of foundations can provide insights in applications (Dekel and Lipman [2010] ; and Spiegler [2008] ). Recently, the literature has displayed a growing interest to integrate bounded rationality considerations into classical theory models of industrial organization (Spiegler [2011] ), contracts (Koszegi [2014] ), and implementation (Korpela [2012] ; and, de Clippel [2014] ). Among two-stage procedures, the TSM model seems particularly well-suited to these applications: while it departs only marginally from the standard paradigm, it accommodates a wide range of choice phenomena (see the examples in Section 2). In the hope of encouraging further applications of the TSM model, I devote Section 6 of the paper to illustrate how the main results are useful in a variety of natural applications (see .
A second motivation is to establish clear connections in the empirical scope of various two-stage procedures. Frequently, differences in axiomatic approaches make it difficult to compare these models in terms of behavior. 4 The characterization of the TSM model suggests that exclusivity conditions might provide a simple basis to compare shortlist methods. To support this intuition, I establish an additional result (Theorem 6): by progressively weakening Strong Exclusivity, one obtains characterizations of related models that dispense with transitivity for the second rationale (Matsuki and Tadenuma [2013] ) or both rationales (see Manzini and Mariotti [2007] ; and, Rubinstein and Salant [2008] ). While these models were originally characterized along different lines, the treatment here provides a unified approach for understanding all three models in terms of choice reversals. A final (but equally significant) motivation relates to the principle of parsimony. Given the wealth of recent two-stage models (see Section 7), it is worth understanding whether the TSM model accommodates the kinds of choice anomalies most frequently observed in practice-or whether a more general model is required. The main results furnish the tools necessary to pursue this question. The identification results give a simple way to infer the rationales from choice data that is readily collected in experimental and market settings. What is more, Strong Exclusivity makes it easy to test the model (Theorem 7): for choice data consistent with Manzini and Mariotti's [2007] more general model, Strong Exclusivity holds if and only if there is no "short" cycle of reversals related to choices from "small" menus. By comparison, the acyclicity condition used in prior characterizations of the model is stronger and, consequently, more difficult to test. Even though it is unlikely to be relevant in practice, it is worth noting that this advantage disappears when Strong Exclusivity is tested on its own. In that case, the computational complexity of testing Strong Exclusivity is comparable to the acyclicity condition used in prior characterizations.
5
Layout: Section 2 presents the TSM model, briefly discussing some applications and related models. The next two sections contain the main theoretical results of the paper: Section 3 provides an axiomatic characterization of the model while Section 4 gives identification results. Section 5 takes a step back from the TSM model to highlight the important role played by exclusivity conditions in a broader range of two-stage procedures. In turn, Section 6 illustrates the usefulness of the theoretical results in a variety of applications. Finally, Section 7 discusses the contribution of the paper relative to prior work.
Preliminaries
I first present the TSM model more formally before discussing some applications and related models. 4 In recent work, Tyson [2013] makes clear progress on this question by developing a common framework to characterize a variety of models. One drawback is that his approach relies on acyclicity conditions as an essential ingredient. 5 Two distinct tasks are involved in testing each of these axioms: definition and evaluation. The first requires the analyst to identify the relevant reversals by considering every menu in the choice data. When there are n alternatives, this means that up to O(2 n ) menus must be considered. In turn, the second task requires the analyst to search for a combination of reversals that is "prohibited" by the axiom. For both axioms, the complexity of this task is O(n 2 ).
The TSM Model
Let X denote a finite choice domain. A rationale P is an asymmetric binary relation on X (i.e., for all x, y ∈ X , xPy precludes y Px). It is total if xPy or y Px for all distinct x, y ∈ X ; and, transitive if xPy and y Pz imply xPz for all x, y , z ∈ X . A transitive shortlist method (TSM) is a pair (P 1 , P 2 ) of transitive rationales (i.e., quasi-transitive preferences) that defines a choice function c (P 1 ,P 2 ) : 2 X → X as follows: c (P 1 ,P 2 ) (B) ≡ max(max(B; P 1 ); P 2 ) for all B ⊆ X where max(A; P) ≡ {x ∈ A : no y ∈ B s.t. y Px} denotes the P-maximal alternatives in A. Conversely, a pair of transitive rationales (P 1 , P 2 ) on X is a TSM-representation of the choice function c : 2 X → X if c(B) = c (P 1 ,P 2 ) (B) for every menu B ⊆ X . In this case, c is said to be TSM-representable.
Applications
Despite its simplicity, the TSM model accommodates a wide range of choice phenomena. To highlight its flexibility and relevance in applications, consider some examples drawn from the recent literature: Framing (Salant and Siegel [2013] ) Because of framing at the point of sale, the consumer chooses from the seller's menu of products B according to a total preference P f that differs from her "true" total preference P. After the consumer leaves the store and the framing effect dissipates, she returns the product chosen from B unless it is preferred to her outside option o / ∈ B according to P.
Homophily (Cuhadaroglu [2015] ) Two friends influence the choice behavior of one another. Each first maximizes her own preference P before using her friend's preference P to refine her choices.
model, for instance, they capture strategic considerations in a two-stage game: the first reflects the intra-category preferences of the doer while the second reflects the preferences of the forward-looking planner. In the other applications, the rationales reflect the tension between "true" preference P and another factor (whether psychological, environmental, or social) that influences behavior.
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In each case, the interpretation imposes some structure on one of the rationales (beyond transitivity). In the compromise model, for instance, the first rationale prefers x to y precisely when: the second rationale prefers y to x; and, the two alternatives belong to the same category. In the other examples, the rationale with additional structure is the one unrelated to true preference. For instance, every comparison in the first rationale of the status quo model involves the default; and, no comparison in the first rationale of the framing model involves the outside option.
Of these models, only the homophily model is well-understood in terms of choice behavior. 9 What is more, Cuhadaroglu's characterization of that model exploits the kinds of insights developed here. In Section 6, I show how the results provide an understanding of behavior in the other applications as well.
Other Shortlist Methods
The TSM model is related to a variety of other shortlist methods which impose more or less structure on the rationales. Yildiz [2015] ) specializes the TSM model by requiring the second rationale to be total. Since the added structure of the second rationale in this model imposes no restrictions on behavior beyond those associated with the TSM model, the two models are equivalent in terms of axiomatics and identification. The table below summarizes the features of the rationales in each of these models:
To simplify, I ignore the possibility of multi-valued choice (which is ruled out by the TSM model). As stated, choice in the homophily model can be multi-valued. While the other examples all rule out this possibility, each can be extended to accommodate multi-valued choice by dropping "total" where it is specified (as is done in some of the cited papers). 8 In the homophily model, the first rationale reflects true preference. In the other three models, it is the second. 9 The extreme status quo model has only been characterized jointly with a second status quo model (described in Section 6). In turn, characterizations of the compromise and willpower models exist only for the menu preference domain. Besides the TSM model, I also establish results related to some other shortlist methods in Table 1 . To facilitate the discussion, I postpone the comparison to previous work on these models until Section 7.
Axiomatic Foundations
I show that the TSM model may be characterized in terms of two prevalent choice reversals.
Choice Reversals
The standard model of strict preference maximization is characterized by the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Intuitively, this axiom ensures that choice behavior does not depend on the availability of alternatives which are not ultimately chosen by the decision maker. Formally:
Intuitively, IIA rules out context effects where the choice of one alternative requires the presence of another. When such effects are present, the addition or removal of an unchosen alternative may cause the decision maker to reverse her choice. The experimental literature points to two choice reversals that are particularly prevalent. In the first type of reversal, the addition of an unchosen alternative "directly" prevents the choice of another. Formally, a choice function c displays a direct x, y reversal on B ⊆ X \ {x} if c(B) = y and c(B ∪ {x}) / ∈ {x, y }.
A well-documented bias consistent with this behavior is the attraction effect (Huber et al. [1982] ). Put in terms of this effect, the idea is that the presence of x attracts the decision maker to choose c(B ∪{x}) over y . Intuitively, this violates IIA because x plays an attracting role unrelated to preference.
In the second type of reversal, the removal of an apparently "weak" alternative has an impact on choice. Formally, a choice function c displays a weak x, y reversal on B ⊃ {x, y } if c(x, y ) = x and c(B) = c(B \ {y }).
With this type of behavior, y affects the choice from B despite the availability of an alternative x that is pairwise preferred.
12 When c(B) = y , a weak alternative is chosen from B despite the presence of an apparently stronger alternative. When c(B) = y , the behavior is suggestive of limited attention (Masatlioglu et al. [2012] ). Here, the idea is that the decision maker only considers (and ultimately chooses) the alternative c(B) because y attracts attention to it. In either case, the behavior violates IIA because y plays a special role that is unrelated to preference.
While this discussion makes it clear that these two choice reversals are inconsistent with IIA, more surprising is that any choice behavior inconsistent with IIA must display both types of reversal:
Theorem 1 For a choice function c, the following are equivalent:
(i) c satisfies the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; (ii) c displays no direct reversals for any pair of alternatives; and, (iii) c displays no weak reversals for any pair of alternatives.
A Simple Axiomatization
It turns out that a single axiom, called Strong Exclusivity, characterizes the class of RSMs with TSMrepresentations. The strength of this axiom is to provide a clear understanding of the context effects consistent with the TSM model. To illustrate, first consider a weaker version of this axiom:
Exclusivity For every pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X × X , either:
(i) c displays no weak x, y reversals; or, (ii) c displays no direct x, y reversals.
For any pair of alternatives, this axiom precludes choice behavior which exhibits both of the context effects discussed above. Put differently, the possibility of weak reversals for a given pair of alternatives is ruled out by observing a single direct reversal for that pair (and vice versa).
In terms of choice, Exclusivity is tantamount to the transitivity of the first rationale:
Lemma 1 If c is RSM-representable, then: it is T 1 SM-representable iff it satisfies Exclusivity. When both rationales are transitive, weak reversals are also ruled out "indirectly" by certain pairs of direct reversals. 13 Formally, c displays an indirect x, y reversal on B ⊆ X \ {w , x} if c(B) = y , c(B ∪ {x}) = x, c(B ∪ {w , x}) = w , and c(B ∪ {w }) = z / ∈ {y , w }.
Here, the role of x is to "obscure" that y is directly reversed by w . To elaborate, observe that the first three choices are IIA-consistent. In fact, the second and third choices are consistent because the direct x, z reversal on B ∪ {w } leads to c(B ∪ {w , x}) = w . If it led to any other choice, the attracting role of w would be apparent even without observing c(B ∪ {w }). In this way, the direct x, z reversal on B ∪ {w } serves to obscure the direct w , y reversal on B.
Using this notion of indirect reversals, Strong Exclusivity may be stated as follows:
Strong Exclusivity For every pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X × X , either: (i) c displays no weak x, y reversals; or, (ii) c displays no direct or indirect x, y reversals.
This axiom strengthens Exclusivity. For a given pair of alternatives, direct reversals and indirect reversals both rule out weak reversals. This restriction on choice captures the transitivity of both rationales: 
The first axiom (also called Sen's γ) is the standard requirement that choices from larger menus be consistent with choices from smaller menus. In turn, the second axiom weakens IIA (or, equivalently, WARP for choice functions) since it requires c(B) = y rather than c(B) = x when c(A) = x = c(x, y ). Interestingly, Weak WARP also has a natural interpretation in terms of exclusivity:
Weak Exclusivity For every pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X × X , either: (i) c displays no weak x, y reversal for any menu B such that c(B) = y ; or, (ii) c displays no direct x, y reversals.
This axiom weakens Exclusivity. For a given pair of alternatives, direct reversals continue to rule out weak reversals where the weak alternative is chosen. However, they do not rule out weak reversals where the weak alternative merely "attracts" the decision maker to a different choice. 13 In the standard model of preference maximization, an "indirect" revealed preference x c I y is a chain of "connected" pairwise preferences x c ... c y (see Section 4.1 below). In the TSM model, an indirect x, y reversal is a chain of three connected weak reversals y , z , z, w , and w , x (see Section 5.2 below).
In the presence of Expansion, Weak Exclusivity is equivalent to Weak WARP. 
Identification
I first show that choice reversals on small menus define revealed rationales for the TSM model before showing that these revealed preference definitions extend naturally to larger menus. Finally, I show how revealed preference may be used to characterize the entire class of TSM-representations.
Revealed Rationales
The proof of Lemma 1 provides an insight that will serve as the foundation for the revealed preference exercise. To formalize, define the (usual) pairwise preference c by x c y if c(x, y ) = x; and, define an n-cycle to be a sequence x 0 ... (i) c(x, y ) =c(x, y ) for all {x, y } ⊆ X ; and, (ii) c(x, y , z) =c(x, y , z) for all 3-cycles xy z.
This shows that choices from small menus pin down behavior in the TSM model. The standard model of preference maximization exhibits the same kind of "small menu" feature. As in that model, this feature makes it possible to provide simple revealed preference definitions in the TSM model.
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To fix ideas, suppose (P 1 , P 2 ) is a TSM-representation of c. Notice that the two rationales together (P 1 ∪P 2 ) must contain the pairwise preferences in c . Otherwise, (P 1 , P 2 ) cannot induce choice behavior consistent with c for every menu of two alternatives. This observation shows that identification in the model effectively boils down to assigning the preference pairs in c to one of the rationales. In this case, the choice from {x, y , z} determines how to divide the preference pairs. If c(x, y , z) = z, for instance, x must eliminate y before y eliminates z. So, xP 1 y and y P 2 z. Since P 1 is transitive, zP 2 x as well. Otherwise, zP 1 xP 1 y so that zP 1 y which contradicts y c z. (Since it depends on the transitivity of P 1 , this inference about P 2 is not justified in the RSM or T 2 SM models.) Next, consider the task of assigning the pairwise preference x c y when w xy z is a 4-cycle consisting of overlapping 3-cycles w xz and w y z such that c(w , x, z) = w and c(w , y , z) = z: Following the same reasoning as in the last paragraph, y P 2 zP 2 w P 2 x. Since P 2 is a transitive rationale, xP 1 y as well. Otherwise, y P 2 zP 2 w P 2 xP 2 y so that P 2 contains a cycle. (Since it depends on the acyclicity of P 2 , this inference about P 1 is not justified in the RSM or T 1 SM models.) Collecting the observations from the last two paragraphs motivates the following definitions:
Definition 1 Given a choice function c, first define the binary relations R Theorem 3 If c is TSM-representable, then:
However, there are weak reversals which are not reducible to a single small menu reversal.
To illustrate, consider a T 1 SM-representable choice function c that exhibits the pairwise preferences in Figure 2 . Now, suppose c(w , x, y , z) = w = z = c(w , x, z). Since c(x, y ) = x, this means that c displays a weak x, y reversal on {w , x, y , z}. Since Expansion requires c(w , x, y ) = w = c(w , x) and c(x, y , z) = x = c(x, z) however, c does not display a weak x, y reversal on any smaller menu.
This example suggests how to extend R Part (ii) of the definition reflects the weak x, y reversal in the example above.
19 As the next result shows, this captures the extent to which weak reversals are irreducible in the T 1 SM model:
16 Since c(w , x, y , z) = w by Expansion, Definition 1(1)(ii) describes an indirect x, y reversal on {y , z}. 17 In the standard model, the revealed preference P c is defined by xP c y if x ∈ c(B) and y / ∈ c(B) for some menu B such that y ∈ B. The "small menu" feature of that model implies that this boils down to the pairwise preference c . 18 Formally: if a weak x, y reversal where y is chosen occurs on B, then it also occurs on {x, y , z} for some z ∈ B. 19 To see this, note that Expansion and Weak WARP require c(w , y , z) = w for the choices in this example. flexibility in TSM-representations, the model accommodates a range of applications where the rationales are given a specific interpretation and some additional structure (as discussed in Section 2).
Even without a particular application in mind, the analyst may wish to rule out certain representations. In general, a TSM-representation (P 1 , P 2 ) may contain duplication (xP 1 y and xP 2 y ) or conflict (xP 1 y and y P 2 x) between the rationales. To limit this kind of redundancy, the analyst might focus on minimal representations. Formally, a TSM-representation (P 1 , P 2 ) is minimal if P 1 ⊆ P 1 and P 2 ⊆ P 2 for no other TSM-representation (P 1 , P 2 ). Intuitively, these representations estimate each rationale P i as conservatively as possible given the estimate P −i of the other rationale.
Theorem 5 shows that either of the revealed rationales P 
Exclusivity in Shortlist Methods
I first show that two generalizations of the TSM model (the T 1 SM and RSM models discussed in Section 2 above) may also be characterized in terms of Expansion and an exclusivity condition. I then show how the exclusivity requirements of the TSM and T 1 SM models are particularly straightforward to test.
Empirical Scope
Given Manzini and Mariotti's characterization, Lemmas 1 and 3 establish the following:
Theorem 6 A choice function c is:
-representable if and only if it satisfies Expansion and Exclusivity; and,
(ii) RSM-representable if and only if it satisfies Expansion and Weak Exclusivity.
Combined with Theorem 2, this result pinpoints the key similarities and differences in behavior among three shortlist methods. While all three models satisfy Expansion, the two generalizations of the TSM model impose progressively weaker exclusivity restrictions on potential choice reversals.
This suggests a parallel with choice under uncertainty. Just as independence conditions differentiate among models in that setting, exclusivity conditions provide a basis to distinguish among shortlist methods. The analysis in Section 6 below only serves to reinforce this point. For the specialized TSM models considered there, exclusivity considerations play a key role. 22 It is worth noting some features of these rationales. First, Q To be clear, the point is not to undermine the significance of Weak WARP. To the contrary, this condition describes the exclusivity inherent in every shortlist method (Lemma 3). Rather, the point is to suggest that the concept of exclusivity itself provides a powerful tool for analyzing two-stage procedures. Indeed, one can develop key insights into specialized shortlisting models simply by considering how they strengthen the exclusivity requirements associated with the RSM model.
Testability
Not only do exclusivity conditions help distinguish among shortlist methods, but they provide a practical way to test these models in experimental and market settings. To rule out the possibility that choice data is consistent with a given exclusivity condition, it is sufficient to identify a pair of "incompatible" choice reversals. In the worst case, all of the reversals in the data must be considered.
While it is quite simple, this "naive" approach actually overstates the difficulty of testing axioms like Strong Exclusivity. The intuition comes from observing the connection between indirect and weak reversals: if c is RSM-representable, then an indirect x, y reversal amounts to a chain of three connected weak reversals y , z , z, w , and w , x .
23 As such, Strong Exclusivity rules out particular four-cycles of weak reversals: if c displays a chain of weak reversals (arising from an indirect x, y reversal), then it cannot display a weak x, y reversal. In a similar fashion, the incompatibility between direct and weak reversals implied by Strong Exclusivity rules out particular three-cycles of weak reversals.
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As it turns out, the connection to cycles of weak reversals is even more fundamental than these observations suggest. For RSM-representable behavior, Strong Exclusivity precludes all three-and fourcycles of weak reversals; and, conversely, choice functions without such cycles satisfy Strong Exclusivity. What is more, there is a similar connection between Exclusivity and three-cycles of weak reversals. Given Theorem 4, these observations can be stated more succinctly as follows: This result provides a very practical way to test the requirements of (Strong) Exclusivity beyond Expansion and Weak WARP. 25 It is worth emphasizing three features of this test that are particularly appealing: (i) the test is based on one type of choice reversal only; (ii) the behavior of interest is restricted to small menus; and, (iii) the scope of the test is limited to "short" cycles. 23 An indirect x, y reversal consists of choices c(B) = y , c(B ∪ {x}) = x, c(B ∪ {w , x}) = w , and c(B ∪ {w }) = z / ∈ {y , w } for some menu B. To see where the stated weak reversals arise, first observe that: c(y , z) = y and c(z, w ) = z by Weak WARP; and c(w , x) = w by Expansion. Then, it is easy to see that c displays the following weak reversals: a y , z reversal at B ∪ {w }; a z, w reversal at B ∪ {w , x}; and, a w , x reversal at B ∪ {w , x}. 24 A direct x, y reversal consists of choices c(B) = y and c(B ∪ {x}) ≡ z / ∈ {x, y } for some menu B. If c(x, z) = z, then this can be parsed into a pair weak reversals at B ∪ {x}: a y , z reversal (since c(y , z) = y by WWARP); and a z, x reversal. So, Strong Exclusivity also rules out the particular three-cycle of weak reversals x, y , y , z , and z, x . 25 In fact, it also provides another way to characterize the TSM and T 1 SM models. In particular: c is TSM-representable (T 1 SM-representable) iff it satisfies Expansion, Weak WARP, and its weak reversals are quadruple-acyclic (triple-acyclic).
Applications of the Results
The theoretical results presented in the previous sections are motivated by the fact that the TSM model is well-suited to applications. In this section, I first show how these results provide insights into the kinds of specialized choice models that are likely to figure in applied work. I then highlight the implications for some classical theory applications where it is natural to incorporate two-stage choice.
Specialized Models of Two-Stage Choice
The homophily model in Section 2 concerns mutual influence between two agents: the choices c of one agent are determined by the transitive rationale pair (P, P ) while the choices c of the other are determined by (P , P). To axiomatize the model, Cuhadaroglu [2015] relies on a simple observation: for any pair of alternatives, c and c cannot both display weak reversals. This natural exclusivity condition follows from Theorem 4. Since the "second" rationale of one agent is the "first" rationale of the other, no pairwise preference can be revealed to be in the "second" rationale for both agents.
Cuhadaroglu's analysis highlights how the revealed rationales may yield insights into specialized TSM models. In this section, I show how the other results in Sections 3 and 4 also provide tools to understand these models. To illustrate, I first consider the model of status quo bias described in Section 2 before outlining a general recipe that is suitable for any specialized TSM model.
Status Quo Bias
Formally, the extreme status quo (ESQ) model from Section 2 is parametrized by (d, P, U d ) where: d ∈ X is the default option; P is a transitive and total rationale on X ; and, U d ⊆ {x ∈ X : xPd} are the alternatives "unaffected" by the status quo bias. The choice from a given menu B ⊆ X is:
This model amounts to a shortlist method where the first rationale reflects the bias against the "affected" alternatives A d ≡ X \ U d while the second reflects the "true" preference P. In particular, (d, P, U d ) is TSM-represented by (E , P) where the rationale E is defined by dE a if a ∈ A d . This natural representation shows that the model displays a limited range of reversals on small menus. Given parameters (d, P, U d ), every 3-cycle must take the form aud where a ∈ A d , u ∈ U d , and aPuPdE a. Since c (d,P,U d ) (a, u, d) = u, the only direct reversals on small menus are d, a reversals. By Theorem 4, every direct reversal must take this form. So, choice must satisfy the following condition:
ESQ Exclusivity For all distinct alternatives x, y ∈ X , either:
(i) c displays no direct x, z reversal for any z ∈ X ; or,
(ii) c displays no direct y , z reversal for any z ∈ X .
In other words, at most one alternative (the default) causes direct reversals. Effectively, this is the behavioral implication of the observation in Section 2 about the special structure of the rationales.
Because it limits direct reversals in this way, ESQ Exclusivity also rules out indirect reversals. Given Theorem 6, these two observations lead to a very simple characterization of the ESQ model:
Remark 1 c is ESQ-representable if and only if it satisfies Expansion, Exclusivity, and ESQ Exclusivity.
Relative to more general shortlist methods, the ESQ model is succinctly characterized by an exclusivity property which reflects the decision maker's "extreme" reaction to the default.
Apesteguia and Ballester [2013] also consider a weak status quo (WSQ) model where the default induces a "weak" reaction: when d ∈ B and U d ∩ B = ∅, the choice is max(B \ {d}; P) rather than max(U d ∩ B; P). For small menus, the only direct reversals in this model are u, d reversals. Following the same kind of reasoning as above, this observation allows one to characterize the WSQ model. Compared with Remark 1, the only difference is that ESQ Exclusivity is replaced by WSQ Exclusivity, a property which states that at most one alternative (the default) suffers direct reversals.
A General Recipe
While the goal of the preceding analysis was to illustrate the implications of the results for a particular model, it actually provides a general recipe to understand any specialized TSM model. Starting from a "natural" TSM-representation of the model in question, one can first determine the scope of possible small menu reversals. Given Theorem 4, one can then extend these observations to larger menus in a natural way; and, ultimately formulate a variety of necessary conditions on choice reversals.
The basic intuition is to leverage the "small menu" feature of the model (Corollary 1) to gain broader insights into choice behavior. Consider, for instance, the framing and compromise models from Section 2. By applying the recipe outlined above, it is straightforward to establish the following:
Remark 2 In both the framing and compromise models, choice displays no indirect reversals.
For the framing model, this follows from a simple observation about small menus: one alternative (the outside option) must appear in every weak reversal.
26 For the compromise model, a different observation about about small menus plays a key role: direct reversals only occur between alternatives from the same category. Of the two, the second observation is much more difficult to state in terms of choice behavior. Instead of tying reversals to a single alternative, it ties them to a group of alternatives. To formulate it in terms of behavior, one must first define an equivalence relation ≈ c that partitions X into revealed categories (of alternatives linked through direct reversals). 27 For ≈ c to be consistent with the natural representation described in Section 2, alternatives from the same revealed category must 26 Using this observation, one can in fact characterize the framing model along the lines of the status quo models. 27 To formalize, let x ∼ c y if c displays a direct x, y or y , x reversal. And, let
be compared by the first rationale. Let S c 1 denote the restriction of the pairwise preference to alternatives in the same revealed categories (i.e. xS Categorical Exclusivity For every pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X × X , either:
(i) c displays no weak x, y reversals; or, (ii) the relation x ≈ c y does not hold.
This effectively formulates the simple observation about the compromise model in terms of behavior: alternatives from the same category are not involved in weak reversals (and vice versa). This analysis highlights how Theorem 5 may be used to supplement the recipe outlined above. For some specialized models, one must refine P c 1 to obtain a natural TSM-representation. Since Theorem 5 limits what can be added to P c 1 , it can be used to formulate special exclusivity requirements. Besides the compromise model, the willpower model described in Section 2 also requires this kind of analysis. Without getting into the details, the issue is that the first rationale of the natural TSM-representation has the added structure of a semiorder. 28 
Two-Stage Choice in Applications
In this section, I first illustrate how the results of the paper provide insights into a simple model of monopolistic screening before briefly discussing some other natural applications.
Monopolistic Screening
A monopolist encounters each consumer type i ∈ I with a given probability p i . Her objective is to design a menu of products M ⊆ X to maximize expected profits. For a given menu M, individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) limit the monopolist's ability to sell product m i ∈ M to consumer type i. These conditions require i to select m i above the outside option o as well as every product in M. In the standard setting where the choice behavior c i of type i is represented by a utility u i function, IR and IC impose familiar inequality constraints on the profit maximization objective:
When c i does not admit a utility representation, IR i and IC i reduce to a single constraint:
Since it precludes the use of basic optimization techniques (like those relying on convexity), this type of constraint can make it significantly more difficult to characterize the optimal menu. When consumer behavior is TSM-representable however, the results of the paper can be leveraged to characterize key features of the optimal menu. To illustrate, suppose each consumer type c i is TSMrepresented by (P 1 , P i 2 ) where P 1 is fixed across consumers and P i 2 is a type-specific linear order. The idea is that the monopolist knows the "bias" P 1 of consumers but not their "true" preference P i 2 . This setup captures a private values environment where the behavior of consumers is nonetheless shaped by a common external influence, such as framing at the point of sale or information obtained from a biased media source. Unlike other models in the literature, the private information relates to consumer preferences rather than a psychological parameter (see Koszegi [2014] for a survey). Accordingly, this setup addresses a gap in our understanding of screening with boundedly rational consumers.
To fix ideas, let m i denote the product that consumer type i selects from M ∪ {o}. Then,
defines the expected profits for M. In words, the monopolist obtains a marginal profit π(m i ) > 0 for each consumer type i ∈ I that purchases a product in M and faces a menu cost (m) > 0 for each product m ∈ M. 29 In the sequel, I assume that menu costs are sufficiently small that they only serve to discourage the monopolist from offering a product that does not affect consumer purchases.
In the full information benchmark where the monopolist faces a single consumer type (to whom it is profitable to sell), the optimal menu contains at most two alternatives: a purchase product that is chosen by the consumer; and, in some cases, a decoy product that prevents the consumer from choosing the outside option over the purchase product. Theorem 5 shows that this simple feature extends to the case of asymmetric information about the true preferences of consumers:
Remark 3 If P 1 = ∅, the optimal menu M * contains at most one product d that is never chosen. This product acts a decoy in the sense that c i (M * \ {d} ∪ {o}) = o for some consumer type(s) i ∈ I .
This contrasts with the result in the standard setting. When consumers are unbiased (P 1 = ∅), every product in the optimal menu M * ∅ is purchased by some type. When consumers are biased (P 1 = ∅) however, it may be profitable for the monopolist to introduce a decoy. Intuitively, this allows the optimal menu M * to violate the IR i constraint associated with the true preference of some types. Since the decoy eliminates the outside option (dP 1 o), a biased consumer type (P 1 , P i 2 ) may purchase m i ∈ M * even when her unbiased counterpart (∅, P i 2 ) would select the outside option o. Having said this, the effect on monopoly profits is ambiguous. 30 While bias may help with the IR i constraints of some types, it can also work against the monopolist. When xP 1 m i for some x ∈ M * ∅ ∪ {o}, 29 When the product m ≡ (x, q) ∈ R 2 + consists of a price x and a non-price dimension q, it is conventional to assume that π(m) ≡ x − c(q) where the cost function c is increasing, convex, and c(0) = 0.
30 When M * contains no decoy, the monopolist prefers unbiased consumers (∅, P i 2 ). Since they choose like their biased counterparts (P 1 , P i 2 ) from M * ∪ {o}, the monopolist can achieve the same profits (and potentially more) with M * ∅ .
for instance, the biased consumer type (P 1 , P i 2 ) cannot select the m i ∈ M * ∅ purchased by her unbiased counterpart (∅, P i 2 ). As a result, monopoly profits may be larger with unbiased consumers. Perhaps not surprisingly, the effects on consumer welfare are equally ambiguous (see Example 6 of the Supplemental Appendix). Depending on the specific parametrization, a biased consumer type might be better off choosing from the menu M * ∅ offered to unbiased consumers. Likewise, an unbiased consumer type might be better off choosing from the menu M * offered to biased consumers.
To emphasize that Remark 3 depends on the particular features of the TSM model, notice that the optimal menu M * may contain multiple unchosen products in the more general case where P 1 fails to be transitive. Even in the full information benchmark, it may include a decoy product d 0 , a product d 1 to prevent d 0 from being chosen, a product d 2 to prevent d 1 from being chosen, and so on.
Some Additional Applications
It is worth noting that Remark 3 does not depend on any assumptions about the marginal profits π, the type distribution p, or the bias P 1 . This begs the following question: what (other) features of the optimal contract can be determined non-parametrically from the results of the paper? Indeed, the same might be asked in any contract setting where agents choose according to the TSM model. The question has bearing on recent work by Salant and Siegel [2013] , who study monopolistic screening when agents choose according to the framing model. In their setting, some features of the optimal contract are independent of the type distribution. In light of Remark 3, it would be interesting to see what might be learned directly from the insights about the framing model (described in Section 6.1). Besides contracting, implementation is another area where there have been efforts to incorporate bounded rationality. For Nash implementation, Moore and Repullo's [1990] condition µ is necessary and sufficient in the standard setting where agents are preference maximizers. Recent work shows that part of this condition remains necessary even when no restrictions are placed on agents' behavior (Korpela [2012] ; and de Clippel [2014] ). In general, this Weak µ condition (see Remark 4 of the Supplemental Appendix) can be difficult to check. When agents choose according to the TSM model however, it may be possible to check this condition more systematically. Since the model satisfies Expansion, a result of Korpela [2012, Lemma 1] effectively limits what needs to be checked. It would be interesting to see whether the results of the current paper might be used to impose further limitations.
Another natural application to implementation is dominant-strategy house allocation. In the standard setting, serial dictatorship and top trading cycles each implement the Pareto optimal allocations (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1998] ). In recent work, Bade [2008 Bade [ , 2013 shows that the two mechanisms need not coincide when agents choose according to the TSM model. Based on a few simple inferences about revealed preference (related to Figure 1 ), she also develops some insights into both mechanisms. In light of Bade's work, it would be interesting to see whether the results of the current paper might be used to characterize the outcomes implemented by these simple mechanisms.
Discussion of Related Work
The TSM model is related to a variety of two-stage models proposed in the recent literature. Most closely related are the other shortlist methods discussed in Section 2. Also related are two-stage procedures where the filtering in the first stage results from something more general than preference maximization (see Tyson [2013] [2013]), also generalize the RSM model by imposing no restrictions on P 2 .
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To conclude, I discuss the contribution of the paper in terms of the related work on these models.
Axiomatics
The TSM Model. The discussion after Theorem 2 suggests an alternative characterization of the TSM model. In lieu of Strong Exclusivity, one might require R 32 While this approach makes it easier to show the sufficiency of the axioms, it comes at the cost of a "technical" acyclicity condition.
Since acyclicity conditions (like SARP) can be difficult to interpret and generally yield few insights into behavior that cannot be determined from the representation directly, they are seldom employed when more straightforward conditions (like WARP) are available.
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With this in mind, a key contribution of Theorem 2 is to establish that R c 2 -acyclicity is not essential to characterize the TSM model. Indeed, this technical condition can be replaced by one which imposes restrictions on readily observable reversals in choice. What is more, this Strong Exclusivity condition implies that the TSM model is much simpler to test than the previous characterizations might suggest. According to Theorem 7(i), it is not necessary to rule out R Regarding the T 2 SM model, Houy's [2008] characterization requires Expansion and an acyclicity condition. Given Theorem 2, one might ask whether this model can also be characterized by Expansion and a "simple" exclusivity requirement. Since exclusivity amounts to no overlap between the revealed rationales, the issue is whether there exists a simple way to define revealed preference in the model. 34 A potential impediment is that the T 2 SM model does not possess the "small menu" feature (so integral to 31 Another generalization of the RSM model allows for more than two rationales (Apesteguia and Ballester [2013] ; Manzini and Mariotti [2011] ). In turn, the rigid sequential structure of the rationales can also be relaxed (Horan [2013] ). 32 Since Expansion and R c 2 -acyclicity imply Weak WARP, one of Au and Kawai's conditions is redundant. 33 For broader discussions of the axiomatic method in decision theory, see Dekel and Lipman [2010] . 34 The issue is the first rationale. For the second rationale, the revealed preference is the same as the RSM model. obtaining simple revealed preference definitions for the TSM model).
Identification
The TSM Model. The prior literature partly addresses some identification issues considered here.
Arguably the closest point of comparison is that several papers define binary relations which are equivalent to R c 2 or R c 2 (Remark 5 of the Supplemental Appendix). An important difference is that none of these definitions is stated in terms of small menus. What is more, the sole purpose in two of these papers (Au and Kawai [2011]; Yildiz [2015] ) is to characterize the TSM model in terms of an acyclicity condition. While a third paper (Lleras et al. [2011] ) is concerned with revealed preference, the focus is not the TSM model, but rather the more general model of limited consideration.
Of these three papers, only Au and Kawai address the first rationale. While they identify a binary relation equivalent to P −1 ) is not easy to interpret in terms of behavior. In fact, it gives the impression that the first rationale is difficult to determine from choice data. Though they go on to show that any transitive rationale P 1 in the range P 
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Other Models. Dutta and Horan [2015] characterize revealed preference in the RSM model. In terms of choice reversals, they show that the first rationale is identified with direct reversals; and, the second with weak reversals where the "weak" alternative is chosen (Remark 11 of the Supplemental Appendix). Given their result, Theorem 4 shows how the added structure of the TSM model strengthens revealed preference. The basic insight is that the transitivity of one rationale sharpens the revealed preference of the other : unless P 2 (P 1 ) is transitive, one cannot draw any inference about P 1 (P 2 ) from indirect reversals (weak reversals where the "weak" alternative is not chosen).
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This insight extends to the T 1 SM model. In that model, revealed preference is "half-way" between the RSM and TSM models (Remark 10 of the Supplemental Appendix): like the RSM model, direct reversals identify the first rationale; and, like the TSM model, weak reversals identify the second.
To close, I emphasize the key role that the "small menu" feature of the TSM model (Corollary 1) plays in identification. While the T 1 SM model shares this feature, many other generalizations of the TSM model do not. In practical terms, this can make it very difficult to do identification in these models. In the RSM model, for instance, observing choices from arbitrarily large menus may be necessary to infer certain aspects of either rationale (Examples 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Appendix). 35 While they suggest that Q c 1 might be defined in terms of choice from menus of four or fewer alternatives (see Remark 1 of their paper), they do not actually define it this way (see Remark 6 of the Supplemental Appendix for the details). 36 The revealed preference analysis in Section 4.1 shows exactly where these two inferences break down. y if c(A) = y for some A ⊂ X and c(A ∪ {x}) / ∈ {x, y }; and, (2) xP In turn, they use these definitions to characterize the class of RSM-representations:
A Appendix

A.1 Axiomatic Foundations
Proposition (D&H) If c is RSM-representable, then (P 1 , P 2 ) represents c if and only if:
(i) P 1 is a rationale such that P
); and, (ii) P 2 is a rationale such that P 2 ⊇ ( c \P 1 ).
The proof also relies on the following five choice properties. The first is due to Au and Kawai (A&K) [2011]:
Reduction (A&K) If c(A) = y and c(B) = x for {x, y } ⊆ B ⊂ A, then: xy z is a 3-cycle s.t. c(x, y , z) = y for some z ∈ A \ B.
The four other properties are as follows:
Selective IIA If c(A) = y and c(x, y ) = x, then c(A \ {x}) = y .
3-Acyclicity
If w xz and w y z are 3-cycles, then c(w , x, z) = x if and only if c(w , y , z) = y .
4-Acyclicity
If w xz and w y z are 3-cycles s.t. c(w , x, z) = w and c(w , y , z) = z, then:
c(x, y ) = x implies c(x, y , v ) = v for any 3-cycle xy v .
5-Acyclicity
If w xz and w y z are 3-cycles s.t. c(w , x, z) = z and c(w , y , z) = w , then:
Briefly, Selective IIA is a weakening of IIA which states that any alternative chosen pairwise over c(A) can be discarded without affecting choice. In turn, the other properties restrict Strong Exclusivity to 3-cycles.
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Since (i) ⇒ (ii) and (i) ⇒ (iii) are obvious, I show (ii) ⇒ (i) and (iii) ⇒ (i). By (i)-(ii), w xy is a 3-cycle. If c(w , z) = w , w zy is a 3-cycle. Given (iii), c(A \ {x}) = c(w , y , z) = z by 3-Acyclicity, which is a contradiction. If c(w , z) = z, w xz is a 3-cycle. Given (iii), c(w , x, z) = z by 3-Acyclicity. So, c(A) = c({y , z} ∪ {w , x, z}) = c(w , x, y , z) = z = y by Expansion, which is another contradiction.
A.1.2 Preliminary Results
Induction
Step: Suppose Selective IIA holds for |A| = n but some A s.t. |A| = n + 1 violates it. 
by definition, the result follows immediately from Lemma 6.
Lemma 8
If c satisfies Weak WARP, Expansion, and {3, 4, 5}-Acyclicity, then R {x 0 , ..., x n−1 } and c(x 0 , x 1 ) = x 0 = c(x 0 , ..., x n−1 ) however, c(x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 violates Weak WARP. This is the desired contradiction.
To establish (ii), first observe that, for n ≥ 5, (i) implies:
To see this, first observe that c(x 0 , x 2 ) = x 0 implies c(x 0 , x 3 ) = x 0 . Otherwise, x 0 x 2 x 3 is a 3-cycle so that x 0 R
By the same kind of reasoning as the last paragraph, c(x 0 , x 2 ) = x 0 also implies c(x n−1 , x 2 ) = x n−1 . By a simple induction argument, it then follows that c(x i , x 2 ) = x i for any i ≥ 4. Applied to each i ≥ 4, the same kind of induction argument gives c(x i , x j ) = x i for any 2 ≤ j ≤ i − 2.
Proof of (ii): Suppose c(x 1 , x 3 ) = x 3 . Consider the cases n = 4, n = 5, and n > 5 separately:
For n ≥ 5, x n−1 x 0 x 1 is a 3-cycle s.t. c(x 0 , x 1 , x n−1 ) = x 0 . To see that c(x 1 , x n−1 ) = x 1 , suppose otherwise. Since c(x i , x n−1 ) = x n−1 for i = 1 by observation (1) and c(x 1 , x n−1 ) = x n−1 by assumption, repeated application of Expansion on {x 1 , x n−1 } implies c(x 0 , ..., x n−1 ) = x n−1 . Since this contradicts c(x 0 , ..., n > 5: Since c(x 3 , x n−1 ) = x n−1 by (1), x 1 x n−1 x 3 is a 3-cycle. Since x 0 x 1 x n−1 is a 3-cycle s.t. c(x 0 , x 1 , x n−1 ) = x 0 , 3-Acyclicity implies c(x 1 , x 3 , x n−1 ) = x 3 so that x 3 R c 2 x 1 and x 1 x 2 x 3 is an R c 2 -cycle of length 3. Since this contradicts the base case, c(x 1 , x 3 ) = x 1 .
For n = 4, (i)-(ii) and c(x i , x i+1 ) = x i directly imply (I)-(III). For n ≥ 5, (ii) implies c(x 1 , x i ) = x 1 for any i = 0, 1 by a simple induction argument along the same lines as (1). Together with (1) and the fact that c(x i , x i+1 ) = x i , this establishes (I)-(III) for n ≥ 5. Since choice from all pairs {x i , x j } are identified, (I) and (II) are immediate. In turn, (III) follows from the base case. If c( (I) and (II) imply that there exists no 3-cycle x 1 x 2 x i . Since x 1 R c 2 x 2 , there exists an a / ∈ {x 0 , ..., x n−1 } s.t. ax 1 x 2 is a 3-cycle and c(a, x 1 , x 2 ) = a. Consider any such a.
To complete the proof, I show that each of the cases n = 4, n = 5, and n > 5 entails a contradiction. n = 4: Here, x 0 x 1 x 3 and x 0 x 2 x 3 are 3-cycles s.t. c(x 0 , x 1 , x 3 ) = x 0 and c(x 0 , x 2 , x 3 ) = x 3 (see Figure 3) . Since c(x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 , 4-Acyclicity implies c(x 1 , x 2 , v ) = v for any 3-cycle x 1 x 2 v . But, this contradicts c(a, x 1 , x 2 ) = a. n = 5: Since c(x 1 , x 4 ) = x 1 and c(x 2 , x 4 ) = x 4 , ax 1 x 4 x 2 is a 4-cycle (see Figure 3 ). There are two cases to consider: (5.1) c(x 4 , a) = x 4 ; and, (5.2) c(x 4 , a) = a. (5.1) Here, x 1 x 4 a is a 3-cycle. Since x 0 x 1 x 4 is a 3-cycle s.t. c(x 0 , x 1 , x 4 ) = x 0 ,  c(a, x 1 , x 4 ) = a by 3-Acyclicity. So, c(a, x 1 , x 2 ) = x 2 by 3-Acyclicity. Since c(a, x 1 , x 2 ) = a by assumption, c(a, x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 . So, x 1 x 4 a and x 1 x 2 a are 3-cycles s.t. c(a, x 1 , x 4 ) = a and c(a, x 1 , x 2 ) 
n > 5: First, observe that (n.1) c(a, x n−1 ) = x n−1 and (n.2) c(a, x n−2 ) = a (see Figure 3) . (n.1) Here, ax n−1 x 2 is a 3-cycle. By the induction hypothesis, c(a, x 2 , x n−1 ) = a. Otherwise x n−1 R
A.1.3 The Exclusivity Axioms (and Proof of Lemma 3)
Proof of Lemma 3. (⇒) By way of contradiction, suppose c(A) = x = c(x, y ) and c(B) = y for {x, y } ⊂ B ⊂ A. Given c(A) = x, Weak Exclusivity ensures that (o) c displays no direct w , x reversals for any w ∈ A s.t. c(x, w ) = w . To derive a contradiction, first define L ≡ {l ∈ B : c(x, l) = x} and B 1 ≡ {x} ∪ L. Then, c(B 1 ) = c( l∈L {x, l}) = x by Expansion. Moreover, c(x, w ) = w for all w ∈ B \ B 1 . Given (o), c(B 1 ∪ {w }) ∈ {x, w } for all w ∈ B \ B 1 . Next, define the following menus by recursion: W i ≡ {w ∈ B \ B i : c(B i ∪ {w }) = x}; and, B i+1 ≡ B i ∪ W i . By a simple induction using Expansion: c(B i ) = c(
Since B \ B 1 is finite, B i+1 = B i for some i ≥ 1. Let i * be the smallest such i. There are two cases. If Lemma 9 If c satisfies Exclusivity, then it satisfies 3-Acyclicity.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose w xz, w y z are 3-cycles s.t. c(w , x, z) = x and c(w , y , z) = y . Contradicting Exclusivity, c displays: a direct z, w reversal on {w , x}; and, a weak z, w reversal on {w , y , z}.
Lemma 10 If c satisfies Weak WARP, Expansion, and 3-Acyclicity, then: it satisfies 5-Acyclicity iff it satisfies Exclusivity. 38 Suppose w xz and w y z are 3-cycles s.t. c(w , x, z) = z and c(w , y , z) = w . By Expansion, c(w , x, y , z) = c({w , y , z} ∪ {w , x}) = w . So, c displays a weak x, y reversal on {w , x, y , z}. By Exclusivity, c displays no direct x, y reversals. Now, consider any 3-cycle xy v . Then, c(x, y , v ) = v as required.
Proof. (⇒)
By way of contradiction, suppose: (a) c(A) = y and c(A ∪ {x}) = v / ∈ {x, y }; and, (b) c(B) = c(B \ {y }) for some B ⊇
Lemma 11
If c satisfies Weak WARP, Expansion, and {3, 5}-Acyclicity, then it satisfies 4-Acyclicity iff the following:
If c displays an indirect x, y reversal, then c displays no weak x, y reversals. 
Lemma 14
If (P 1 , P 2 ) RSM-represents c with P 2 acyclic, then: (i) (P 1 , P * 2 ) RSM-represents c where P * 2 ≡ tc(P 2 ); and, (ii) (P 1 , P * * 2 ) RSM-represents c where P * * 2 is a completion of P * 2 (as guaranteed to exist by the Szpilrajn theorem).
38 In fact, the proof given here only depends on the fact that c satisfies Expansion. 39 In fact, the proof given here only depends on the fact that c satisfies Expansion.
Proof. (i) Consider any A ⊆ X and suppose c (P1,P2) (A) = x. Let B ≡ max(A; P 1 ). Since max(B; P 2 ) = x, ¬[bP 2 x] for all b ∈ B \ {x}. Hence, ¬[bP * 2 x] for all b ∈ B \ {x}. So, x ∈ max(B; P * 2 ). Since P 2 ⊆ P * 2 , max(B; P * 2 ) ⊆ max(B; P 2 ). And, since max(B; P 2 ) = x, max(B; P * 2 ) = x. So, c (P1,P * 2 ) (A) = x.
(ii) The reasoning is identical with P * 2 in place of P 2 and P * * and
2 ) TSM-represents c by Lemma 14. (⇐) Suppose c is TSM-represented by (P 1 , P 2 ). By Theorem 1 of M&M, c satisfies Weak WARP and Expansion. Then, by Lemma 12, it suffices to show {3, 4, 5}-Acyclicity:
3-Acyclicity: By way of contradiction, suppose c(w , x, z) = x and c(w , y , z) = y for 3-cycles w xz and w y z. Since c(w , x, z) = x, zP 1 w . So, c(w , y , z) = w . Since c(w , y , z) = y , c(w , y , z) = z. So, w P 1 y . Since zP 1 w P 1 y , zP 1 y by transitivity of P 1 . But, this contradicts c(y , z) = y .
5-Acyclicity:
Suppose w xz and w y z are 3-cycles s.t. c(w , x, z) = z and c(w , y , z) = w . Then, w P 1 x and y P 1 z. By way of contradiction, suppose c(x, y , v ) = v for some 3-cycle xy v . So, xP 1 y . Since w P 1 xP 1 y P 1 z, w P 1 z by transitivity of P 1 . But, this contradicts c(w , z) = z.
4-Acyclicity:
Suppose w xz and w y z are 3-cycles s.t. c(w , x, z) = w and c(w , y , z) = z. Then, y P 2 zP 2 w P 2 x. By transitivity of P 2 , y P 2 x. By way of contradiction, suppose c(x, y , v ) = v for some 3-cycle xy v . Then, xP 2 y , which contradicts y P 2 x by the asymmetry of P 2 .
Inspection of the proof above shows that it also establishes Lemma 1:
Proof of Lemma 1. (⇒) Points (a) and (b) in the proof of Lemma 2 establish sufficiency. (⇐) By Lemma 12(i), it suffices to show that c satisfies {3, 5}-Acyclicity. The proof of these properties is the same as in the proof of Lemma 2 (since the proofs only rely on the transitivity of P 1 ). Proof.
A.2 Identification
The same argument is found in the proof of A&K's Theorem 1. 
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 4
First, note that c satisfies Expansion, Weak WARP, and 3-acyclicity by Theorem 6 and Lemma 12.
Part (2) 
A.2.4 Proof of Theorem 5
Lemma 25 If (P 1 , P 2 ) TSM-represents c, then
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose xP 1 y and Since P 1 ⊇ P c 1 , w P 1 xP 1 y P 1 z. By transitivity, w P 1 z. But, then c (P1,P2) (w , z) = w = z = c(w , z), a contradiction.
Proof. Suppose xP i y . By definition, there exists a ( c \P i )-chain x 0 ...x n s.t. x 0 = x and x n = y . Consider any link x j ( c \P i )x j+1 of this chain. Since x j c x j+1 and ¬[x j P i x j+1 ], it follows that x j P −i x j+1 . Otherwise, (P 1 , P 2 ) cannot TSM-represent c. So, xP −i ...P −i y . By transitivity, it follows that xP −i y .
Proof of Theorem 5.
(⇒) Suppose (P 1 , P 2 ) represents c. By Theorem 3, P ) by Lemma 2, (P 1 , P 2 ) TSM-represents c by the Proposition of D&H.
B Supplemental Appendix
Section B.1 shows the independence of the axioms, Section B.2 establishes the results mentioned in Section 4.3, Section B.3 establishes the remarks in Section 6, and Section B.4 provides results formalizing the connection to related models.
B.1 Independence of the Axioms
The first two examples describe choice functions that satisfy exactly one of the two axioms for the TSM model:
Example 2 Consider a choice function c on {w , x, y , z} with the pairwise choices given by Figure 2 . In addition, suppose c(w , x, z) = z, c(w , y , z) = y , c(w , x, y ) = w , c(x, y , z) = x, and c(w , x, y , z) = y .
It is straightforward to check that c satisfies Expansion. However, it violates (Strong) Exclusivity because it displays a direct z, w reversal on {w , y } and a weak z, w reversal on {w , x, z}. (Still, it does satisfy Weak Exclusivity. Indeed, c is RSM-represented by the pair (P 1 , P 2 ) where P 1 ≡ {(z, w ), (w , x)} and P 2 ≡ {(y , z), (w , y ), (x, z), (x, y )}.)
Example 3 Consider a choice function c on {x, y , z} such that c(x, y ) = c(x, z) = x, c(y , z) = y , and c(x, y , z) = y .
It is easy to check that c satisfies (Strong) Exclusivity: it displays a weak x, y reversal on {x, y , z}; and, a direct z, x reversal on {x, y }. However, it violates Expansion because c({x, y } ∪ {x, z}) = y = x.
The last two examples shows that Strong Exclusivity is independent from Weak WARP:
Example 4 Consider a choice function c on {x, y , z} such that c(x, y ) = c(x, z) = x, c(y , z) = y , and c(x, y , z) = z.
Clearly, c satisfies Weak WARP (since this condition imposes no restrictions on the domain {x, y , z}). However, it violates (Strong) Exclusivity because it displays both weak and direct x, y reversals (on {x, y , z} and {x, z}, respectively).
Example 5 Consider a choice function c on {w , x, y , z} with pairwise choice given by the linear order w > x > y > z. In addition, suppose c(w , x, z) = c(w , y , z) = c(w , x, y ) = w , c(x, y , z) = y , and c(w , x, y , z) = x.
It is straightforward (but computationally intensive) to check that c satisfies (Strong) Exclusivity: the weak reversals are a, b for a, b ∈ {w , x, y , z} and a > b; the direct reversals are y , w , z, w , and z, x ; and, there are no indirect reversals. However, it violates Weak WARP because c(w , x, y , z) = x = c(x, y ) and c(x, y , z) = y .
B.2 Minimal Representations
In this section, I use the additional notation that P ≡ tc( c \P).
Proof. (i = 1) By way of contradiction, suppose (i) xR Definition 4 A rationale P 1 is P 2 -minimal if (i) (P 1 , P 2 ) TSM-represents c and (ii) there exists no transitive rationale P 1 ⊂ P 1 such that ( P 1 , P 2 ) TSM-represents c. The notion of P 1 -minimality is defined analogously.
Proof. I show: (i) P i ∈ P −i (c); (ii) P i ⊆ P −i ; (iii.a) (P 1 , P 1 ) represents c; and, (iii.b) (P 2 , P 1 ) represents c.
(i) By Theorem 3, P Proof of Remark 2. For the framing model: Since the induced choice function c is TSM-represented by (P f , P), the only 3-cycles involve the outside option o (and alternatives a, b ∈ X ). In particular, aPoPbP f a and c(a, b, o) = o. By way of contradiction, suppose c(x, y ) = x, c(w , x, z) = z, and c(w , y , z) = w for some 3-cycles w xz and w y z. From the simple observation above, it follows that w = o = z. But, this contradicts the fact that w and z are distinct. For the compromise model: Suppose C is the set of categories and P is the preference of the planner. Then, it is easy to show that the induced choice function c is TSM-represented by the pair (P −1 C , P) where P −1 C is defined by xP −1 C y if y Px and x, y ∈ C i for some C i ∈ C. As a result, the only 3-cycles involve a, a ∈ C i from one category and b ∈ C j from another. In particular, aPbPa P −1 C a and c(a, a , b) = b. So, direct reversals on small menus involve alternatives in the same category while weak reversals involve alternatives in different categories. (For the alternatives specified: there is a direct reversal a , a ; and, two weak reversals a, b and b, a .) By way of contradiction, suppose c(x, y ) = x, c(w , x, z) = z, and c(w , y , z) = w for some 3-cycles w xz and w y z (see Definition 1) . From the observation in the last paragraph, it follows that x ≈ c w ≈ c z ≈ c y . Since this means that x and y are in different categories, they are not compared according to the first rationale of (P
by Theorem 3 however, this contradicts the inference that xR c 1 y .
Proof of Remark 3. Suppose M * is profit-maximal. First, observe the following: if y P 1 x for x, y ∈ M * ∪{o}, then x = o.
To see this, suppose to the contrary that x ∈ M * . Since
for all i ∈ I (by Lemma 7). Since x can be removed without affecting choice, M * is not profit-maximal.
Next, suppose m ∈ M * is not purchased by any consumer types. Since M * maximizes profits, there must be some Given the type distribution p, it is optimal for the monopolist to offer biased consumers M * = {a, b} if and only if π(a) + π(b) > 0. In contrast, it is optimal to offer M * ∅ = {a} when consumers are unbiased (since b imposes a menu cost (b) but is not chosen by types 1 to 4). In other words, the monopolist offers different menus to biased and unbiased consumers when π(a) + π(b) > 0. Clearly, biased types 3 and 4 are better off with the menu M * ∅ offered to unbiased consumers. In contrast, unbiased types 5 and 6 are better off with the menu M * offered to biased consumers.
Remark 4 (Nash Implementation) The choice behavior c i (·, θ) of each agent i ∈ I depends on a state θ ∈ Θ that is unknown to the planner. The social welfare function f defines the set of acceptable outcomes f (θ) ⊆ X in each state θ ∈ Θ. The objective is to design a simultaneous game form G such that x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game (G , θ) if and only if it is acceptable at θ. Where NE (G , θ) denotes the Nash equilibrium outcomes of (G , θ), the social welfare function f is Nash implementable if there exists a game form G such that NE (G , θ) = f (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Korpela [2012] and de Clippel [2014] show that the following is necessary for f to be Nash implementable:
Remark To conclude, I correct an oversight in the proof of Au and Kawai's Theorem 1:
Remark 8 While Claim 5 of their paper is correct, the proof contains an error. Along the lines of Lemma 5, they establish that c(B ) = x by Expansion. Using Weak WARP, Expansion, and R a 2 -Acyclicity, they also show that c(A ) = x where A ≡ A \ {z ∈ A \ B : c(y , z) = z or xy z is a 3-cycle s.t. c(x, y , z) = x}. Then, they claim that Weak WARP and Expansion imply c(B ∪ {w }) = x for some w ∈ A \ B such that c(w , y ) = w . The choice function c in Example 2 provides a counter-example to this claim. It satisfies Expansion and Weak WARP but violates the property claimed by Au and Kawai (as well as Selective IIA) since c(w , y ) = w but c(w , x, y , z) = y = x = c(x, y , z).
By Lemma 32 below however, Claim 5 is nonetheless correct by the argument given in Lemma 5.
Lemma 32
If c satisfies Expansion, Weak WARP, and R a 2 -Acyclicity, then it satisfies Selective IIA.
Proof. By Lemma 4, it suffices to show that R Formally, Elimination limits Exclusivity to pairs x, y where c(A) = y for all A ⊇ {x, y }.
Remark 10 Matsuki and Tadenuma also show that behavior consistent with the model can be T 1 SM-represented by ( P m 1 , Q m 2 ) where: P m 1 ≡ tc( R m 1 ); x R m 1 y if there exists a 3-cycle xy z s.t. c(x, y , z) = z; and, Q m 2 ≡ c \ P m 1 . Lemma 1 establishes that ( Q c 1 , R c 2 ) defines another T 1 SM-representation. The proof below shows P m 1 ⊆ P 1 and R c 2 ⊆ P 2 . Together, these facts establish that P m 1 and R c 2 define revealed preference in the T 1 SM model: -x P m 1 y iff xP 1 y for every T 1 SM-representation (P 1 , P 2 ) of c; and, -x R c 2 y iff xP 2 y for every T 1 SM-representation (P 1 , P 2 ) of c.
Proof. Given a T 1 SM-representation (P 1 , P 2 ), the inclusions R m 1 ⊆ P 1 and R show that x R c 2 y implies xP 2 y under branch (ii) of R c 2 . In that case: c(x, y ) = x; and, c(w , x, z) = z, c(w , y , z) = w for some 3-cycles w xz and w y z. By definition, w R c 1 x and y R c 1 z. By (a), w P 1 x and y P 1 z. By way of contradiction, suppose ¬(xP 2 y ). Since c(x, y ) = x, xP 1 y . Since w P 1 xP 1 y P 1 z, w P 1 z by transitivity. But, this contradicts c(w , z) = z.
B.4.3 The RSM Model
Remark 11 Dutta and Horan's definitions of the revealed rationales P y if c displays a weak x, y reversal for some menu B such that c(B) = y . The restatement of (1) is only a matter of definitions. However, the restatement of (2) depends on the additional observation that c(A) = x and c(B) = y for B ⊃ A imply c(x, y ) = x by Weak WARP.
Example 7 Let (P 1 , P 2 ) denote the T 2 SM on X ≡ {x i } n i=1 defined by: -x i P 1 x j if and only if j = i + 1; and -P 2 defined as a transitive rationale such that x n P 2 ...P 2 x 1 . For n ≥ 4, c (P1,P2) is not TSM-representable. This follows from the fact that it violates 3-Acyclicity. To see this, note that x i−1 x i x i+1 is a 3-cycle s.t. c (P1,P2) (x i−1 , x i , x i+1 ) = x i−1 for 1 < i < n. Moreover, one cannot infer x n P RSM 2 x 1 without c (P1,P2) (X ) = x 1 -since c (P1,P2) (A) = x 1 for all {x 1 , x n } ⊂ A ⊂ X .
Example 8 Let (P 1 , P 2 ) denote the T 2 SM on X ≡ {x i } n i=1 ∪ {w , y , z} defined by: -x i P 1 x j if and only if j = i + 1 and x n P 1 y P 1 zP 1 w ; and -P 2 defined as a transitive rationale such that zP 2 y P 2 x 2 P 2 ...P 2 x n P 2 w P 2 x 1 . For n ≥ 1, c (P1,P2) is not TSM-representable. This follows from the fact that it violates 3-Acyclicity. To see this, note that x 1 x 2 w and x 1 x 2 x 3 are 3-cycles s.t. c (P1,P2) (x 1 , x 2 , w ) = w and c (P1,P2) (x 1 , x 2 , x 2 ) = x 1 . Moreover, one cannot infer zP RSM 1 w without c (P1,P2) (X ) = x 1 -since c (P1,P2) (A ∪ {z}) = z for all A ⊂ X \ {z} such that c (P1,P2) (A) = w .
